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Mathematical moments: Autoethnographic excursions with a
mathematical outsider sociologist

Michael Corbett1
Faculty of Education, University of Tasmania, Australia

ABSTRACT: In this essay I offer some reflections on the field of mathematics education,
and particularly the sociopolitical analysis of mathematics education that has emerged in
contemporary scholarship. Here I attempt to do two things. First of all I respond to a
recent book on “disorder” in mathematics education, identifying some themes and
problematics that I find intriguing and generative from my perspective outside the field.
Here I reflect on the way that mathematics is positioned in educational discourse
generally as a proxy for human capital and general intelligence. Next I relate stories from
my life and practice as a primary school teacher in which mathematics, as I understood it,
bumped productively against problems in everyday life. Finally, I conclude with a
reflection on the productive tension between naïve place-based mathematical
understandings and abstract context-bridging mathematical knowledge forms.
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I. Introduction
To begin with, I read and write into the field of mathematics education as an outsider. As
an educational sociologist it seems remarkable to me that what appears to many outside
the field as the abstract, orderly, mysterious and esoteric world of mathematics and
mathematics education is just as fraught with disorder, ambiguity, uncertainty, and
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complexity as any other educational space. In this paper I offer an outsider’s reading of
what I take to be some key sociopoltical issues in mathematics education as they are
articulated in a recent book (Straehler-Pohl, Bohlman & Pais 2017) that takes up the
disorderly nature of the field. This argument about disorder seems to me to reflect both
the order and disorder introduced into contemporary societies by the application of
mathematics in a range of social fields to achieve technical and sociopolitical ends. At the
same time, the book offers a critique of the way that mathematics are presented as both a
proxy for pure intelligence, and an easily quantifiable human capital-related solution for
complex social, economic, and educational problems. Mathematical credentials and
understandings have been, it seems clear to me, constructed as a key form of what
educational sociologists call deficit framing of particular groups of people as deficient
participants in contemporary economies and societies (Gorski 2011, Gutiérrez 2012).
As I read pieces in the edited collection by Straehler-Pohl, Bohlmann and Pais, I
am struck by the irony of the mathematization/demathematization paradox that sits in
many of the contributions. What I mean by a paradox is the way that two apparently
contradictory ideas can simultaneously find support in the messy social spaces in which
we currently operate. I have found this idea and the tensions it contains to be highly
provocative. Here, mathematics is simultaneously central to the conduct of everyday life
while mathematical skills necessary for everyday functioning appear, in many ways, to
have diminished as mathematical machines and algorithms operate much of the working
surface the most advanced capitalist societies (see e.g. Chevallard 2007, Jablonka &
Gellert 2007, Straehler-Pohl 2017). For instance, Chevallard (2007) raises the paradox of
a society that requires mathematics to function, but which contains a majority of people
who have little or no need for most forms of mathematical knowledge. This has rather
obviouc implications for the teaching of mathematics to people whose lives are situated
within this paradox.
What use is mathematics today?
So what use is mathematics today? Or more precisely, how can mathematics be useful for
individuals and groups differently positioned in social space? How can it stimulate order,
how does it promote disorder, and indeed what is the relationship between these seeming
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polar ideas? The question takes on additional complexity as we move from a
consideration of the singular “use” of mathematics to the pluralized idea of multiple
situated “uses.”
Indeed, it seems to me that mathematics education, has tended to relate to: a) the
inherent value study of the subject itself as a formal, orderly system or language and a
valued mental exercise which is often used for social sorting and conflated with
intelligence itself (Bourdieu 1993), and, b) as a practical tool for getting things done, for
example, in the creation of objects and processes, and for the enhancement of capabilities
or “human capital” of groups and individuals. Less common is a framing of mathematics
in political terms as a means of ordering and dividing the world, for example: 1) in the
quantification of human skills, qualities and knowledge, 2) in the comparison and
surveillance of individuals and groups for commercial or regulatory purposes, or 3) in
medical, health and self-care practices through metrics and mathematically derived
procedures. Here we encounter a different sense of the “use” of mathematics as a tool for
technical control rather than individual capability formation (Habermas 1972). A further
and related question concerns why has mathematics been so successful within the
hierarchy of curriculum, but also in the more mundane and functional positioning of
numeracy, along with its indispensible side-kick literacy, as an umbrella meta-curricular
space to be embedded within all school subjects.
It is not new to suggest that it is not the practicality of mathematics that confers
elite curricular status, but precisely the opposite (see e.g. Gates & Vistro-Yu 2003). It can
even be argued that at the societal level, contrary to human capital theory and common
educational discourse, that poor mathematics results may not be particularly
consequential in economic terms. This point was made by Guardian columnist Simon
Jenkins (2016) when he argued that languishing in the international league tables in
mathematics has not harmed the United States or British economies. The same argument
could be made about Germany, Norway, or Australia. This perhaps illustrates one irony
of mathematization/demathematization, which is that even most advanced capitalist
societies the quotidian utility of mathematical knowledge for most citizens is dubious,
and, as Chevallard (2007, p. 56) puts it, “all but a few of their members can and do live a
gentle, contented life without any mathematics whatsoever (emphasis in original).” It
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may also be the case that those nations that score highest on established measures of
mathematics performance like the PISA and TIMSS are neither economic leaders,
innovation trend-setters, nor do they appear to be producing the kinds of creative labour
force leading the emerging phase of global economic development. To use Bourdieu’s
(1984) language, powerful mathematics has become increasingly distant from necessity,
at least the necessities faced by most people in an increasingly risky (Beck 1992) and
even precarious political economy (Standing 2014; Bauman 2000, 2004). At the level of
capital formation and wealth production, the most valuable mathematical knowledge and
procedures have become highly specialized tool kits used to build machines, facilitate
financialization (Sassen 2014), to form, regulate and surveil populations, and to manage
risk.
Another notion in play in the Straehler-Pohl et al. collection is the idea that
mathematics is a bit of a sinister force in the world because it has been largely co-opted
and mobilized to create means of surveillance, control that conceals the exercise of power
behind an allegedly innocent and objective veil of data. The data-driven decision-making
movement both reflects and formats educational practice. There is also a sense in which
the mathematization/demathematization of the world contributes to deskilling many
aspects of contemporary life, subsequently making people more vulnerable and perhaps
lazy in the bargain. This connects rather nicely with the mathematical dimensions of the
problems of alienation and the general capitalist tendency to increase profitability by
replacing labour with machines. Today’s mechanization is significantly mathematical and
algorithmic.
On the other hand, with the advent of big data, mathematics can assume the
mantle of a moral democratizing force offering the potential for mass tracking of opinion
and preference (without the trouble and messiness of debate!). Rule by plebiscite is now
an important conservative policy position, which is not surprising given the power of
established interests to manipulate mass opinion. Leaders can now know with some
precision the will of the masses on a moment-by-moment basis using data people
willingly provide and in turn use this superior knowledge (or even outright lies
masquerading as this form of knowledge as Donald Trump routinely does) to manage
those same populations. As the capacity of social networking and other information-
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gathering technologies increases, the strength of the claims that their owners can make
about somehow “knowing” the mind of the people advances apace (Hague & Loader
1999, Rudder 2014, Townsend 2013). The new knowledge produced by the analysis of
big data have created new ways of holding a mirror up to social processes and have
generated new “games”, an issue I will return to in the conclusion.
This development suggests that the reason for mathematics’ success in the school
curriculum as both an important subject, and as a kind of proxy for raw intelligence, as
Bourdieu (1994) claimed, has to do with how amenable school mathematics is for
creating a disciplined and automatic subject. It is also a useful mechanism for sorting and
selecting cadre of highly trained instrumental workers who can create metrics and
systems of measurement, comparison and predication which can further the insight and
interests of the capitalist class. Mathematics then is sinister because of the ways in which
it tends to be mobilized in the service of established interests.
Autoethnography: The experience of mathematics and the mathematics of
experience
To return though to the problem of whether or not mathematic is any good to ordinary
people in a given social space, I will relate two specific incidents where as a nonmathematician, and indeed as someone who would not really count himself as a
mathematical enthusiast, I came to consider mathematics as a social practice rather than
as a matter of pure calculation. My account is deliberately disorderly, mirroring what I
take to be the messiness of the way I have understood and taught mathematics to primary
students achieving only a faint glimmer of the capacity of mathematical thinking to offer
an orderly sort of direction to my affairs. To illustrate these brief glimpses of what
mathematics could do for me, I offer an autoethnographic (Ellis 2003) account of what I
call two “mathematical moments.
Autoethnography is a way of excavating experience through reflexively through
the process of writing as a methodology in itself (Green 2015). My own background was
working class and like most of my peers I was largely disengaged from secondary school
mathematics barely passing my final courses at the end of high school. I now see my
performance in school mathematics in terms of the conceptual landscapes opened by
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Bourdieu (1984, 1992) and Bernstein (1977, 2000, 2008), which speaks to the differential
ability of young people to be able to achieve the point of sight required for success in
higher mathematics, and in other areas of advanced school curriculum. For me,
mathematics did not address mundane problems and I could not deal well with what I
saw as the decontextualized, irrelevant, and what appeared to me at the time as silly
symbolic games in mathematics class. Yet even relevance was still not enough to allow
me to see the “inside” mathematical thinking behind and beyond automatic calculation.
There were several childhood mathematical moments I might choos where the
mathematics I encountered at school became real for me. One began when my father took
me to the bank at age 12 after I asked for a bicycle. “Of course you can have a bike if you
want one,” he replied which came as a bit of a shock. “It’s time you learned about credit,”
he continued. My father then took me to the local Credit Union where I met the manager
and a loan was promptly organized for $35 at an annual interest rate of 12%. As the
months passed and I slowly repaid the loan from my paper route earnings, I became
acutely aware of the importance of percentage.
Another example came when the older brother of a friend showed me how to play
chess in the second or third grade. I progressed from mastering the moves of each piece,
to seeing geometric patterns on the board, to strategizing several moves ahead by setting
up scenarios and traps for my opponent. Baseball pitchers’ earned run averages, hitters’
batting averages, and ice hockey goalkeepers’ goals-against average taught me the
nuances of the average and its relation to probability. The geometry and physics of the
snooker table and the combinations of rationality and strength involved in carpentry and
auto mechanics were also part of the general mathematical education of a working class
adolescent in the 1970s in small town Canada. Still, I floundered in mathematics class.
These lessons were indeed real and they made me a wiser consumer, better at
DIY, more astute in strategic games, and a more informed sports fan. They brought me
into contact with the systematic ordering that mathematics can provide. But they did not
cause me to change my mind in the sense of being better prepared, for example, for the
inferential statistics I would be required to get my head around in higher degrees in the
social sciences. The situations I recount in this narrative relate to specific mathematical
moments that caused me to think about the world differently, not because of the neatness
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and utility of mathematical thinking, but rather because of the disorder introduced to me
by mathematical engagement. I wonder here whether the disorder of mathematics is
potentially more important than the order it is often purported to represent. Furthermore,
I wonder whether or not mathematics education should not be more explicitly oriented
toward creating dissonance and uncertainty more than order and rule-following.
In the first mathematical narrative shared below, I encountered difficulty with
mathematics as a set of pure, context-free calculations. In this situation I was assumed to
possess more mathematical skills than others in my working group simply because I was
a university student accustomed to “paper work.” In the end though, it was one of my
railway track-gang colleagues who showed me how to use mathematical principles in a
messy world. This instruction in “good enough” mathematics or estimation, allowed me
to achieve a workable, approximate solution rather than a theoretically perfect disaster. In
other words, I learned to take mathematical abstractions and ground them in a messy
lived situations. In the second instance, I describe how one of my elementary school
students made the leap in the opposite direction by leaving the concreteness of her
corporeal world to enter an imagined, abstract mathematical space. There she met a
spectral average person and began the journey that eventually led her to an advanced
degree in physics.
II. Ordering a disorderly world: The good enough curve
Through the late 1970s and early 80s, I attended university in fall and winter and worked
on railway track crews, or “gangs” through the spring and summer months. I loved the
separation of these two parts of my life. In winter I could read and socialize with friends
at university and when the weather warmed up in May I would go to work until late
August and the end of summer to return once again to university study. The year I turned
twenty, I took a job on a “surfacing gang”. I worked as a labourer shovelling gravel and
spiking railway ties while a group of three machines lifted, surfaced and aligned the
track. It was hot, sweaty work involving some manual dexterity, but mostly raw physical
strength.
My role was to be part of a crew of labourers who worked alongside the
machinery taking care of those inevitable anomalies along the track that foiled the flow of
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mechanized production. Our job was to keep the machines working steadily and
efficiently, clearing obstacles to production. The three machines used by this late 1970s
surfacing gang on a marginal rail line in Atlantic Canada are shown in Figures 1-3.

Fig. 1 Torsion beam tamper

First in line is the torsion beam tamper (Fig. 1). This machine raised the track,
levelled it, and tamped gravel beneath the ties. The “projection buggy” in front shone a
light back at the machine that would regulate how high the tamper should raise the track
to make it level. This was done when the black triangular board on the front of the
machine raised enough to block the light, which caused the tamper jacks to stop lifting
the track.

Fig. 2 Track liner

Next came the track liner (Fig. 2) that aligned the track into neat parallels. By the
early 1980s this machine was pretty much obsolete and the only photo I could find is this
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one. The mechanism on the front drove a large metal pin or “spud” into the ground to
stabilized the machine and then hydraulic motors moved the track either left or right in
order to straighten it.

Fig. 3 Ballast regulator

Finally, the ballast regulator depicted in Figure 3 distributed the ballast gravel and
swept the track bed clean with enormous circular brushes. The end result was smooth,
stable, flat-surfaced (no bumps), aligned, and neat railway track.
One day the foreman came to me and said something like this: “Murray got a job
up the line.” Murray was the “curve plotter” who worked with the middle machine, the
track liner. The foreman went on to say something like this: “You’re a college boy so you
can go work with the track liner graphing curves.” I had no idea what Murray did, and
neither did the foreman when I asked him. The foreman figured that I could handle the
“paperwork” because of my “college” background. I wasn’t really given a choice.
I was “trained” by the somewhat taciturn man running the track liner and given a
book that contained engineering specifications for each curve on the line. Straight track
was easy. I had nothing to do. I brought a novel and sat on a rock as the track line worked
away. But when we encountered curves I had to take readings at specific intervals, using
an apparatus that measured alignment or lack of alignment of a segment of curved track,
and plot the existing curve on graph paper. I was given an instruction manual that had
diagrams such as this patent drawing for this procedure to illustrate what I was supposed
to do (Figure 4). The dots on he graph paper represented readings taken by the operator
indicating the actual position of the track before alignment. The curve on the graph paper
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represents the best fitting line and my machine would move the track left or right until the
track sat exactly on the plotted curve.

Fig. 4 Patent diagram for railway track alignment

Thus, after plotting the existing curve on graph paper, I then created a best fitting
line that would make the curve nicely rounded and match the engineering specifications
for how the curve was supposed to look, roughly in accordance with the diagram in
Figure 4. The result, for a curve that was not substantially “out of line” would look
something like Figure 5.
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Fig. 5 Best fitting line

My job was then to return with the track-aligning machine to the beginning of the
curve, which would pull each errant x (which represented the actual “disordered” position
of the track) onto the rounded curve, which represented the desired orderly, “lined” track.
This was consequential work. If I did my job poorly, a train could derail. So I dutifully
consulted the engineering manual and plotted my curves with great care. For the first
couple of curves, things went quite well, but then we moved into an area of wet ground
where the track had sunk into the mud and was badly misaligned when the tamper
completed its lift and surface. We managed to get the straight track sorted out but the
curves were a mess. On my plot, each little x was well away from any nice rounded
regulation curve that I could draw. So as we returned to straighten the track, we needed to
move the track enormous distances to make it fit my ideal line. After a time we realized
that we were pulling the track almost out of the rail bed in order to create the desired
curve.
We carried on for a time. The foreman started to get nervous because we were
falling behind the tamper and slowing up production. The man who ran the ballast
regulator behind us waited patiently in the cab of his dusty machine sometimes emerging
to give us advice. Our curve was perfect and orderly. The “math” looked good. The
trouble was that my orderly plot did not fit the disorderliness of the existing rail bed, and
by moving the track so far we were destabilizing it. Everyone could see that there was a
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problem. A mechanic and the superintendent were called in. They looked at the track.
They looked at my plots. They looked at the engineering manuals. Everything was done
according to the rules, but the result was extremely slow progress because we were
moving the track back to where it was when the railway was built generations before. I
was left to continue on.
Eventually, the tamper operator wandered back to see what we were doing. His
machine was so far ahead of ours that he couldn’t really carry on further. When he looked
at what I was doing he said, “wait a minute, this can’t work.” He explained to me that
when you encounter a curve that is seriously askew as this one was a perfect curve is
impossible. Forget the engineering specifications he said. “You aren’t building that
perfect track, you’re fixing this one. Those fools who run this railway don’t live in the
real world with us.” Then he showed me how to make an imperfect curve out of a series
of “steps” (Fig. 6). "Them x’s are what you have to work with son, not what’s in that
book,” he said.

Fig. 6 An imperfect “curve” created in steps

By constructing the curve as a series of stepped line segments (Fig 6), I could
create a good-enough functional and safe approximate curve that would look great and
take much less time. I carried on this way for the rest of the summer and had lots of time
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to sit on the rocks amidst the din of the machinery and read my books. The foreman was
happy; production had returned to normal.
At issue here is the truth of the text, in this case the engineering specifications and
the ideal mathematics that they imagined. In the end, experience, risk, improvisation and
judgment were required to tame the formatting power of the mathematics (Skovsmose,
1994) that was understood to rule the situation. It is perhaps not surprising that none of
my superiors could tell me how to dissolve the abstract mathematical order, bend the
rules, and fabricate a different mathematics that would create an approximated order and
allow the work to proceed. I was shown, by a peer how to juxtapose formal rulefollowing with estimation and site-specific human judgment necessary to produce a
“good enough” railway curve. D. W. Winnicott (1995) developed his concept of the good
enough mother to describe a desirable level of parental care. Too much attention will
damage the child, as will not enough. There is a sweet spot of good-enoughness that
allows the child autonomy but gives enough direction to support development.
How to find that good–enough space is always a matter of estimation and more or
less calculated imperfection. In this experience I came to see mathematics as a matter of
skilled improvisation, judgment and even creativity. I had to judge the extent to which the
actually existing curve could be aligned to approximate the perfect curves inscribed in the
engineering diagrams.
By the end of the summer I seldom consulted the technical manual and relied
more and more on my ability to construct a smooth but imperfect curve. I had no idea that
I had stumbled on a set of ancient mathematical problems that led out of the Pythagorean
Theorem, to pi and the calculation of the area of circles, and on to Newton’s calculus.
This realization took another twenty years and chance encounters with mathematical
ideas in narrative form (Ogawa 2009, Ellenberg 2014).
III. A counterintuitive mathematical leap: Imagining someone who isn’t there
A fundamental problem in learning mathematics is, in my view, a question of trust that
allows the mathematician to navigate and negotiate between the corporeal world and a
dimension of thought where sets of relational abstractions operate. These abstractions,
powerful as they are, require a certain kind of faith and a leap into the unknown for
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children. Much mathematical curriculum today seeks to concretize these relational
abstractions, but in the end, the goal is to cause the learner to abandon a fixation on the
concrete and enter another dimension of relational thought.
In the Childhood of Jesus, J. M. Coetzee (2013) creates the character of a child
who refuses to either read, write or do the mathematics required of him in school. His
particular rationale for not engaging with mathematics is because he finds the basic
problem of counting and adding things together to be problematic. One and one do not
equal two, because for this child each individual thing is unique and different.
Put an apple before him and what does he see? An apple; not one apple, just an apple. Put
two apples before him. What does he see? An apple and an apple. Now along comes Señor
Leon (Señor Leon is his class teacher) who demands: How many apples child? What is the
answer? What are apples? What is the singular of which apples is the plural? Three men in
a car heading for East blocks: who is the singular of which men is the plural-Eugenio or
Simon or our friend the driver whose name I don’t know? Are we three, or are we one and
one and one? (Coetzee 2013, p. 284 – italics in original)

The child’s radical ontology caused him to see the world in terms of discrete
things that should not be reduced to comparable classes, and thus, which were impossible
to sensibly combine through a simple act of calculation.

Without making this

fundamental ontological leap required of all school children, is mathematics even
possible? It is this leap that we expect students to make. But why should they? Like
Coetzee’s protagonist, I am not asking this question in a cheeky way, but rather to
suggest that one effect of developing a mathematical sensibility is to learn to think in
reductionist ways rather than in ways that to recognize subtle differences and attend to
nuance. In discussions of research methodology this is not a particularly new
conversation and problems of the juxtaposition of classification and rich description are
routinely discussed and debated. In curriculum conversations, mathematics education
discourse and particularly in the political spaces concerned with boosting test scores and
implementing programs, an “attitude” like that Coetzee’s protagonist undoubtedly
appears dangerous and disorderly, if not sick and disordered. Can we assume though that
all children should and will make this ontological leap easily and naturally. And to what
extent? A related question concerns how the child in Coetzee’s novel might have been
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taught mathematics in such a way that his formal mathematical skills might have
developed.
The second mathematical moment I want to relate came from a teaching
experience in rural Nova Scotia (Canada). I was, for nearly a decade, a teacher in a grade
5-6 multigrade classroom in a small school. This was the early 1990s and the NCTM
standards were newly embedded in provincial curriculum from primary to grade 12.
Primary teachers, myself included, struggled with the expanded scope of what we were
expected to do with our students. The established mathematics curriculum focussed
primarily on speed and accuracy, for the most part in basic operations algorithms,
combined with a very cursory introduction to percentage, fractions, ratio, simple
geometry, etc. Prior to reforms in mathematics curriculum of the 1990s, automaticity,
speed and accuracy in simple calculations were pretty much all that was required of both
primary students and of their teachers. And of course, the struggle over curriculum
continues in debates around return to mathematical “basics” which continue in many
contexts to be constructed in terms of automatic calculation.
One of the NCTM strands that teachers in my school seemed to be able to grasp
most easily was statistics. We worked on sampling and probability through a wide range
of experiences and data collection exercises. I spent about three weeks with my class in
an attempt to determine whether Black Jack is a fair game. The dealer in our games had
to hit until the points totalled 17 and then stop. Players could do what they wanted. We
recorded each game played and after several hundred recorded games concluded that
overall, the dealer was in a winning position and that Black Jack was not a fair game. It
was obvious that the children who were assigned to be dealers had more of our fake
currency than those assigned as players. I saw this exercise as one form of childproofing.
We also did a number of surveys, some of which included investigations of
student opinion on aspects of school policy such as how to divide the playground
amongst different age groups. Very quickly my grades 5 and 6 students who were the
eldest in the school learned to manipulate their surveys, at first by over-sampling children
in their classes and then by manipulating younger students to give the answers they
wanted. All of this led to discussions about sampling and the ethics of consent and indeed
about power and persuasion.
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When it came to calculating central tendency in data using mean, the median and
mode, we did a fairly standard exercise with the height and weight of students in the
class. When it came to the average weight and height of the children in the class, the
result failed to match the results for any particular person. I think I must have been using
the terms normal, average, and mean interchangeably because one student made the
remark that there is no one in the class who is normal. I don’t have the verbatim transcript
but it went something like this:
Student 1: Normal weight in this class is 96 lbs. But nobody is 96 lbs.
Teacher: That’s right.
Student 2: That means that none of us are normal (laughter and snide comments).
Teacher: The mean is a concept, it means the middle.
Student 3: The middle of what?
Teacher: Well, the middle of the group.
Student 1: Like when we all lined up from the shortest to the tallest there was someone in
the middle.
Teacher: (Attempting humor) Yes, that is the mean person … you’re not laughing.
Actually this is the median person.
Student 1: But the math is wrong because there is nobody in the middle for weight.
Student 3: What do you mean?
Student 1: Nobody is 96 lbs., so nobody is in the middle.
Teacher: Nobody has to be in the middle. They might be, but in this case nobody was.
Student 2: So the math is wrong.
Teacher: No, the math is right but nobody fits exactly in the middle.
Student 1: So who is the mean?
Teacher: Nobody. It’s an idea.
Student 1: Not a person?
Teacher: That’s right.
Student 1: So they expect us to imagine a person who isn’t there.

This is an exchange that betrays my own lack of attention to the distinctions
between statistical and social norms or between mathematical and value-laden ethical
language. This raises the question as to why I used the term “normal” at all knowing full
well its value-laden implications it held for my students. I have no answer to this question
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other than to suggest that my linguistic carelessness with mathematical language is
probably not unusual, and that it is indicative of the relatively disorderly way I
approached the teaching of mathematics.
There are a number of other things I remember from this exchange. Student 1 was
struggling to get her head around a disembodied concept. We went on to establish a
persona for the “mean boy” and “mean girl,” the shadowy character who sat in the middle
of things and who was perfectly “normal” but who was invisible, malicious, and couldn’t
be trusted. Using the mechanism of the person who wasn’t there, some students were able
to embrace and play with the ideas of central tendency and data itself as an abstraction
drawn from living beings. But at the same time, my blurring of normative and descriptive
mathematical terminology probably created additional confusion. This illustrates how as
a teacher, I inelegantly used the relatively disorderly ethical normative language to
promote an orderly understanding of a mathematical relationship.
Student 1 shows particular creativity and insight, in part because she found a
space in which to play between order and disorder. She asked a provocative mathematical
question when she wondered about the identity of the mean itself. Who is in the middle
of a data set, or who is normal? In doing so she illustrated her ability to abstract or in
effect, to be wiling to make an ontological leap and see what isn’t there categorizing
things and beings based upon characteristics operationalized as variables. She may or
may not have confused statistical and social uses of the term normal, but the core feature
of this shift is to move from seeing concrete individuals to seeing variables and
categories, i.e. things that are not really there. This ability to extrapolate the invisible out
of the visible is, in important respects, the sort of ontological move necessary for
participation in formal mathematical learning. In a sense, one must be able to see what is
not there, move beyond context-bound perception, and trust in an abstract vision. Was my
student developing a foundational sense of the larger notion of inference and was she, as
a result of her playful questioning about an absent presence, on the way to powerful
mathematical thinking in the sense of Michael Young’s (2007) conception of “powerful
knowledge” as non context-dependent, systematic and specialized? Of course, I can never
know for certain.
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IV. Back into context: Social class, formatting and power
One way to think about the problem of the invisible being in the middle of a group of
people who are reduced to data points is to consider how classification has been found to
operate amongst differently positioned social actors. What I am trying to suggest above is
that it is not the instances in which mathematics came to seem real and useful to me (as
important as they were) that were most important to the refinement of what I would now
see as a more developed mathematical sensibility that can help me see what is not
obviously there.
The general findings associated with the work of Bernstein (1977), for instance,
advance the claim that middle class students are more likely to use general classification
strategies to group objects while working class students are more likely to generate
classifications that are more specific to their personal lives (Bernstein 2000, Cooper
1998, Holland 1981, Walkerdine 1988). This is the ability to appropriately use what
Bernstein (2000, p. 31) called “recognition rules” or the inclination to understand the
particularities of the context from another point of sight and the power relations in play
within the context. The capacity to do this in school tasks is, following Bernstein,
unevenly distributed amongst the social classes with people positioned more marginally
tending to think in ways that relate intimately to an immediate, experiential locale. As
Cooper (1998) points out, this is not a question of concrete or abstract thinking, but rather
one that is more or less attuned to presence and absence and the immediacy of the
lifeworld, and I would argue, family, mobility and literacy practices. What academic
study requires is what I have described elsewhere as a kind of mobile sensibility that is
able to transcend place (Corbett 2005, 2009).
I think this mathematical sensibility may also involve a way of thinking about the
world that takes too seriously spectral presences found in manufactured mathematical
space. Today, there is growing concern about the algorithms that make choices for us and
that structure the way we are governed and targeted for marketing. Some of the best
minds of the emerging generation of capitalists owe their fortunes not to making objects
or finding and processing resources, but rather, to having advanced mathematical skills
combined with business acumen and foresight relating to the creation of nonmaterial
objects. The fact that Mark Zuckerberg, Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Elon Musk and
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Tasmania’s David Walsh are mathematicians or at least mathematical enthusiasts whose
products are essentially ideas, creates fuel for the myth that mathematics paves the road
to prosperity. Like many myths, this one contains truth. As I suggest above though, there
seems to be evidence that the societies that seem to produce the best results collectively
on international assessments of mathematics may not be leading the world in economic
and social innovation. But the myth of mathematics as the engine of growth and
development also contains a core conservative kernel, which is that the game itself is
what is important rather than the algorithms and assumptions that make the game work. It
also assumes that understanding the game itself, and becoming an efficient and effective
player, rather than challenging or questioning the way it is constituted is more
fundamental to education. All games though have cultural, social and political roots and
they contain foundational assumptions that format and organize play and perception.
I offer one final story that is now more than 20 years old. When my son was a
small boy, he was fascinated with computers and gaming. One of the first computer
games we played was Sim City. My son enjoyed playing this game and he quickly learned
how to get his cities to grow to a great size in a peaceable and prosperous way. On the
other hand, my cities would often descend into chaos and fail to grow. So one day I asked
him how he managed to grow such vibrant and prosperous cities. “Simple,” he said.
“Two things you need to keep in mind. First of all, keep the taxes below 7%. Secondly
make sure you have lots of police stations.” He showed me both how to prosper in the
game but also how the assumptions built into the algorithm were subtly training gamers
to think conservatively.
Mathematics is intimately involved in political spaces, and the ways in which
hidden mathematics structures social space, the mathematization of the world, is a topic
that ought to be foregrounded in contemporary curriculum. Often though it appears that
there is more public and political interest in teaching primary school students how to code
than there is in teaching them how to think about the way that their experience in real and
imagined space is coded. Could it be, all of the rhetoric about how STEM education is
crucial for future economic prosperity, that there is more money to be made by teaching
children to do as they are told? While there seems to be less interest today in automaticity
and speed and more interest in analytic thought to meet the human resource needs of
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contemporary capital, the ideal mathematics student imagined in contemporary
curriculum may be no more engaged than I was in my 1960s and 70s school mathematics
classes.
It is also still the case that highly divergent mathematical content is offered to
young people differently positioned in social space (Schmidt, Burroughs, Zoido &
Houang 2015). It is encouraging that there is work in mathematics education that helps
young people understand how math is a tool that can be used to illuminate situations of
social injustice and oppression, which is important as well (Gutstein 2003, Moses &
Cobb 2002, Skovsmose 1994a). There is no avoiding how mathematics is intimately
bound up in the intricacies of a messy world, power differentials, unequal access to
resoruces, and diverse forms of social practice. Indeed mathematics itself is social
practice that is unevenly distributed and differentially taught along the lines of
contemporary social divisions such as social class, race, ethnicity and gender. This leads
me to the conclusion that there is good evidence to support the idea that for some, even
for most people, the demathematization of everyday life will only deepen even as
mathematics becomes more central to the way life is organized.
What this comes around to is the relationship between identity and mathematics,
which is why I chose narrative to illustrate my argument. First of all, as my story of the
good enough curve illustrates, the mathematical understandings I have acquired have
come to me through experience. I wonder if my notion of narrative “mathematical
moments” might have value in mathematics education? Can we help our students find
and tell mathematical stories from their lives? Secondly, mathematics must take place
somewhere, which is the point of the first story; but it must also take place nowhere,
which is the point of the second story. In the two stories, the problem of visibility and
invisibility, tangibility and intangibility, order and disorder illustrate how what I
understand to be powerful mathematics learning occurs in the thirdspace in-between. The
examples I used foreground the importance of those moments in which school
mathematics became “real”. Much mathematics curriculum today is properly focussed on
the experiential hooks that ought to be present in good math learning. Nevertheless, what
mattered more were those biographical situations that involved an integration of order
and disorder.
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Thirdly, my last story raises political questions about the formatting power of
mathematics and questions of power more generally in mathematics and in mathematics
education. Extending the problem of power and the extrapolation of powerful learning
from local contexts remains a problem upon which we have not made significant progress
in decades of educational research. In a recent analysis of AERA presidential addresses
relating to what we know about learning, Carol Lee (2016) concludes that most of what
educational research has discovered is tempered by how little we still understand about
the all important influence of context. Following Bernstein’s (1977) lead, the relationship
between different knowledge forms and the places and spaces in which they are enacted
and valued remains the most difficult and intractable of educational problems.
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